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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that contemporary biomedicine is shaped by two, seemingly 
incommensurable, organisational logics, the ‘regime of truth’ and the ‘regime of 
hope’. We articulate their features by drawing on debates sparked by the recent 
clinical trial of a new approach to the treatment of Parkinson’s Disease. We also 
argue that the ‘self’ is configured in the very same process whereby these two 
organisational logics interlock and become mutually dependent, so that the ‘self’ 
might be said to be the effect of a ‘parasitic’ relationship between the regimes of 
‘truth’ and ‘hope’. We then bring these two arguments to bear on the contrasting 
views of the relationship between embodiment and political subjectivity articulated 
by Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, on the one hand, and Paul Rabinow and 
Nikolas Rose, on the other hand. 
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BETWEEN TRUTH AND HOPE: ON PARKINSON’S DISEASE, 
NEUROTRANSPLANTATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF THE ‘SELF’ 
 
Who is Alfred? 
We would like to open a series of critical reflections on the contemporary, biomedical 
production of the ‘self’ with the following excerpt from Jonathan Franzen’s novel The 
Corrections: 
 
Alfred was standing in the master bedroom wondering why the drawers of his dresser 
were open, who had opened them, whether he had opened them himself. He couldn’t help 
blaming Enid for his confusion. For witnessing it into existence. For existing, herself, as a 
person who could have opened these drawers.  
 
‘Al? What are you doing?’  
 
He turned to the doorway where she’d appeared. He began a sentence: ‘I am …’ but when 
he was taken by surprise, every sentence became an adventure in the woods; as soon as 
he could no longer see the light of the clearing from which he’d entered, he would realize 
that the crumbs he’d dropped for bearings had been eaten by birds, silent deft darting 
things which he couldn’t quite see in the darkness but which were so numerous and 
swarming in their hunger that it seemed as if they were the darkness, as if the darkness 
weren’t uniform, weren’t an absence of light but a teeming and corpuscular thing, and 
indeed when as a studious teenager he’d encountered the word ‘crepuscular’ in McKay’s 
Treasury of English Verse, the corpuscles of biology had bled into his understanding of 
the word, so that for his entire adult life he’d seen in twilight a corpuscularity, as of the 
graininess of the high-speed film necessary for photography under conditions of low 
ambient light, as of a kind of sinister decay; and hence the panic of a man betrayed deep 
in the woods whose darkness was the darkness of starlings blotting out the sunset or 
black ants storming a dead opossum, a darkness that didn’t just exist but actively 
consumed the bearings that he’d sensibly established for himself, lest he be lost; but in 
the instant of realizing he was lost, time became marvellously slow and he discovered 
hitherto unguessed eternities in the space between one word and the next, or rather he 
became trapped in that space between words and could only stand and watch as time 
sped on without him, the thoughtless boyish part of him crashing on out of sight blindly 
through the woods while he, trapped, the grownup Al, watched in oddly impersonal 
suspense to see if the panic-stricken little boy might, despite no longer knowing where he 
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was or at what point he’d entered the woods of this sentence, still manage to blunder into 
the clearing where Enid was waiting for him, unaware of any woods - ‘packing my 
suitcase,’ he heard himself say. This sounded right. Verb, possessive, noun. Here was a 
suitcase in front of him, an important confirmation. He’d betrayed nothing.  
 
But Enid had spoken again. The audiologist had said that he was mildly impaired. He 
frowned at her, not following. 
 
‘It’s Thursday,’ she said, louder. ‘We’re not leaving until Saturday.’  
 
‘Saturday!’ he echoed.  
 
She berated him then, and for a while the crepuscular birds retreated, but outside the 
wind had blown the sun out, and it was getting very cold (Franzen, 2001: 12-13). 
 
The Corrections tells the story of the fictional Lambert family from the different 
perspectives of its five members. Alfred is suffering from Parkinson’s Disease (PD) 
and is progressively slipping toward dementia and death; Enid is Alfred’s stubborn 
and ever hopeful wife; Gary is the pragmatic, eldest son, who is told by his own wife 
to seek professional advice for his ‘depression’, if he wishes to keep his marriage 
intact; Chip is the youngest son who was fired from his post of professor in cultural 
theory, for sexual harassment; and Denise is the emotionally confused daughter and 
chef. Alfred’s rapidly deteriorating condition is the point of contention that brings 
this seemingly dysfunctional family together. According to Gary and Enid, Alfred 
should be convinced that, at the very least, the Axon Corporation, which has 
exploited Alfred’s invention of a semi-conducting material to develop a new 
treatment for PD, owes him inclusion in its experimental trials of this new treatment. 
Denise, however, fears that she will be forced to house her parents, if Alfred is to be 
able to participate in the trials. Finally, Chip believes that Alfred should be left alone, 
to deal with his mortality in his own way. As these four negotiate between 
themselves, Alfred, the once youthful reader of Arthur Schopenhauer, who, like the 
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German philosopher, has always believed in the meaninglessness of the world, 
becomes progressively detached from all these positions. For the reader, as for the 
four other members of the Lambert family, Alfred’s disengagement is both 
frustrating and puzzling: Why is Alfred not interested in getting better? Why will he 
not at least admit to the hopelessness of his situation?  
 
In this paper, we try to articulate a possible answer to the puzzle that Alfred poses. 
Recognising that, in The Corrections, PD figures both as a substantive topic and a 
metaphorical device, our thesis is that the increasingly familiar predicament in which 
all five members of the Lambert family find themselves captures a wider tension 
structuring knowledge and experience of the ‘self’ within the domain of 
contemporary biomedicine. We argue firstly that biomedicine is shaped by two 
conflicting organisational logics, which, in many ways, evoke the divisions within the 
Lambert family. These two organisational logics are the ‘regime of truth’ and the 
‘regime of hope’. While undoubtedly courting confusion with the medical ‘regimen’, 
we none the less wish to label these organisational logics as ‘regimes’ to thus 
emphasise not just the public articulation of particular political subjectivities, usually 
associated with the word ‘discourse’, but also their embedding in usually far less 
visible social networks and material practices (see Foucault, 1991; Thevénot, 2001). 
We will attend to these two organisational logics by drawing on the debates recently 
sparked by the clinical trial of a new approach to the treatment of PD, examining in 
considerable detail conflicting opinions about the viability, desirability and outcome 
of the trial. Importantly, we do not wish to imply that the organisational logics and 
conflicts to which we attend are in any way novel to the domain of biomedicine (see, 
for example, Marks, 1992; 2000). We do wish to note, however, that clinical trials no 
longer are a vehicle for an impossible escape from politics, but have instead become 
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the medium of political engagement within the biomedical domain (Epstein, 1996; 
see also Dehue, 2002). Having established this opposition, we argue secondly that a 
particular configuration of the ‘self’ is constituted in the very same historical process 
whereby the two, largely autonomous, organisational logics eventually interlock and 
become mutually dependent. In other words, we address the way in which a 
particular configuration of the ‘self’ might be said to be the historical effect of an 
increasingly ‘parasitic’ relationship between the regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ (see 
Serres, 1982; Brown S., 2002). We will conclude by drawing on this particular 
understanding of the relationship between ‘truth’, ‘hope’ and the ‘self’ to answer the 
questions that Alfred’s disengagement poses for both his fictional family and that 
reader of The Corrections who is mindful of all their contemporary resonance. 
 
Putting neurotransplantation to the test 
On the 15 March 2001, few readers of the Guardian, a leading British daily 
newspaper, could have failed to take note of following headline and picture (see also 
Dumit, 2004). 
 
Figure 1: Guardian, 15 March 2001. 
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Sophie Petit-Zeman, one of the Guardian’s writers, fleshed out the dramatic headline 
by writing that: 
 
Earlier this week it was announced that a trial of a new treatment for Parkinson’s disease 
had, for some patients, gone horribly wrong. A group of volunteers in the US had foetal 
cells transplanted directly into their brains, in the hope that they would survive and 
produce dopamine, the ‘chemical messenger’ missing in patients suffering from 
Parkinson’s. But the researchers were horrified to discover that instead of being helped by 
the experiment, a small number of the patients got much worse. The cells appear to have 
gone into overdrive, producing too much dopamine and causing the patients to writhe 
and jerk their heads uncontrollably. Unlike many experimental procedures, scientists 
have no way of reversing this particular treatment. The experiment has been stopped 
completely, prompting despair in many sufferers who hoped it offered a possibility for a 
cure (Petit-Zeman, 2001; emphasis added).  
 
While, for most readers, this would have been their first encounter with the field of 
neurotransplantation and the therapeutic, intracerebral implantation of embryonic 
neuronal material, for those involved with PD, either through their research, their 
investment, their care of others or their personal experience, this was very important 
news. The Parkinson’s Disease Society, the leading British charity in the field, for 
example, was quick to position itself by announcing that ‘despite setbacks in recent 
surgical trials’, the intracerebral implantation of embryonic neuronal tissue provides 
‘early evidence and real hope of a breakthrough’ in the treatment of PD (Parkinson’s 
Disease Society, 2004). Martin Edwards, the chief executive of ReNeuron PLC, a 
company specialising in the development of biological products for the treatment of 
neurological disorders, was of the same opinion. Even Sir Iain Chalmers, ‘director of 
… an international organisation that collects evidence on experimental treatments, 
and a leading expert on clinical trials’ is reported to have acknowledged the ethical 
problems raised by human experimentation, but to have none the less maintained 
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‘that he would have participated in the trial himself. In the sense that any results, 
even negative ones, are invaluable, he persists in viewing this experiment as ‘a 
tremendous success” (Petit-Zeman, 2001). Such ‘negative’ results, however, did not 
constitute a positive outcome for all parties involved. Thus, another report on the 
trial, this time in the New York Times, suggested that professional opinion was far 
more divided than the Guardian’s opposition of public and professional responses 
would suggest. In this report, some researchers appeared to call for the halting of all 
transplants of embryonic neuronal tissue and the focussing of research on more 
reliable sources of implants, such as stem cells, the undifferentiated, pluripotent cells 
that constitute the early embryo. Others appeared instead to question the legitimacy 
of the entire enterprise, because, either way, it involved the exploitation of human 
embryonic material (see Kolata, 2001). While it is tempting to attribute this more 
strictly professional disagreement to a peculiarly American debate over the legal 
framework for research on stems cells and associated technologies, such an 
interpretation oversimplifies the positions taken, because a number of other actors, 
removed from this peculiarly American context, also felt that the outcome of the trial 
called the future of stem cell technology into question. We suggest that, to 
understand the linking of the trial and the future of stem cell technology, we must 
first understand the conditions under which the trial was conceived and conducted.  
 
While the use of L-DOPA (L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine) as a pharmaceutical 
treatment for PD gained increasing support from the mid-1960s onward and has 
today become a stable component of the therapeutic repertoire, the understanding of 
underlying mechanisms still is a matter of debate (Hornykiewicz, 2002). Moreover, it 
is widely agreed that the use of L-DOPA does not in fact provide a satisfactory 
treatment of PD. As much as L-DOPA might increase the neuronal synthesis of 
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dopamine in those parts of a particular region of the brain, the substantia nigra, that 
have not yet degenerated, it neither slows down nor arrests the more general process 
of neuronal decay.  
 
 
Figure 2: The brain 
 
Over the same forty years, some researchers have argued that the transplantation of 
neuronal tissue and consequent modification of neurophysiological function in 
laboratory animals suggests that implanted neurons can bypass degenerating ones 
and re-establish physiological transmission between the substantia nigra and the 
striatum regions of the brain. As such, they have also argued that 
neurotransplantation might offer a more effective approach to the treatment of PD 
than the use of L-DOPA (see Breeze & Wang, 1999). Since the late 1980s, there have 
therefore been numerous ‘open’ clinical trials of the intracerebal transplantation of 
embryonic neuronal tissue. These were trials involving the statistical comparison of 
pre- and post-operative clinical condition of patients who had volunteered to have 
embryonic neuronal tissue implanted in their brain. Although most of these trials 
suggested that neurotransplantation offered a viable approach to the treatment of 
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PD, it remained controversial, largely for the following two reasons. The first was 
that there were strong objections to its dependence of implants collected from 
aborted foetuses, not only due to moral objections to abortion, but also due to 
concern about the possible abusive exploitation of the human body (see Boer, 1996). 
The second reason was that, from the perspective of health care buyers and 
providers, in the context of an increasingly managerial approach to health care, 
neurotransplantation was not only a dangerous procedure, but also one that was 
expensive and difficult to standardise (Blue Cross/Blue Shield Technology 
Evaluation Center, 2001).  
 
In 1994, as a consequence of the above concerns, the United States National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) took an initiative that is characteristic of post-war health 
care politics (Marks, 1997; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). The NIH attempted to settle 
the debate over the value of neurotransplantation for PD by sponsoring a trial that 
could be seen as methodologically sound by both the supporters and opponents of 
the procedure. More specifically, it decided to sponsor a ‘double-blind, placebo 
controlled’ trial of the intracerebral implantation of embryonic neuronal cells in 40 
patients that were afflicted by PD. As Curt Freed, the neurosurgeon at the University 
of Colorado who was charged with the responsibility of conducting the trial, 
recollects in the final report on the trial, ‘transplantation of embryonic dopamine 
neurons into the brain of patients with Parkinson’s Disease has proved beneficial in 
open clinical trials … [but] … whether this intervention would be more effective than 
sham surgery in a controlled trial … [was] … not known’ (Freed, 2001: 710). The 
patients were therefore divided into two groups, one in which cultured cerebral 
tissue from four human embryos was implanted bilaterally, along 30 to 40 mm 
needle tracts in the putamen region of the brain, and one which underwent ‘sham 
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surgery’, in this case, the boring of cranial holes without any placement of the 
embryonic cells. The primary evaluation did not show any significant differences 
between the treatment and control groups: The recipients of the implants showed 
better outcomes in the ‘objective measurements of PD’, but some of the recipients 
eventually developed dyskinesias, that is, abnormal and uncontrolled movements, 
typically one year after surgery (National Institute of Neurological Disorders and 
Stroke, 2000). As noted by Sophie Petit-Zeman, these dyskinesias were attributed to 
the uncontrolled growth of the implanted neuronal tissue. This said, by 2000, the 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield Technology Evaluation Center was anxious to advise health 
care buyers on the relative merits of pharmacological and surgical approaches to PD, 
presumably because the latter was increasingly being offered to those affected by PD 
and Blue Cross/Blue Shield was being asked to cover its considerable cost, US$ 40 
000 (see Kolata, 2001). While the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Technology Evaluation 
Center expressed therefore some interest in the impending, final report on the trial, 
it undertook its own statistical review of earlier ‘open’ clinical trials and concluded 
that the surgical approach did not in fact provide a viable alternative to 
pharmacological treatment (Blue Cross/Blue Shield Technology Evaluation Center, 
2001; see also Polgar, 2003). In other words, it seemed to the Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
Technology Evaluation Center that the NIH trial could not add very much to the 
picture generated by its statistical review, and, when the final results of the trial were 
eventually released, what it added was not the greater clarity to which the NIH had 
aspired, but still more doubt about the effectiveness of the surgical approach to PD.  
 
Importantly, the NIH trial was not problematic simply because its results did not in 
fact settle the questions about the effectiveness of the surgical approach to PD, but 
because the methodological design of clinical trials was also called into question. As 
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Roger Albin, a neurologist at the University of Michigan, noted, ‘the recent use of 
sham surgery in trial evaluating efficacy of intracerebral fetal tissue graft in 
Parkinson’s Disease has highlighted the ethical concerns associated with sham 
surgery … [but] … appropriate clinical trial design, sometimes including sham 
surgery, is needed to ensure that false positive trial results do not occur and 
endanger public safety’ (Albin, 2002: 322). Albin was seeking to thus respond to 
those observers who, after the release of the trial’s results, raised questions about the 
ethics of ‘human experimentation’, and, at the very least, called for both the 
abandonment of randomised controlled trials and a return to comparisons of pre- 
and post-operative conditions (see Dekkers & Boer, 2001). Such questioning, 
however, was not the exclusive prerogative of those who had always found the 
surgical approach to PD less than convincing. It also involved those who, while 
accepting that results of the trial were disappointing, were nevertheless still 
convinced of the value of neurotransplantation as a treatment for PD. Thus, for the 
Network of European Central Nervous System Transplantation and Restoration 
(NECTAR), a powerful professional association in this domain, the severest criticism 
was that the trial always was likely to be unproductive and inconclusive because 
those conducting it were so convinced of the merits of their approach that, just one 
year into the trial, they offered the treatment to many patients in the control group 
(see Nikkah, 2001). The underlying commitments of this alternative position are 
perhaps best expressed by Eugene Redmond, a neurosurgeon at Yale University, who 
admitted quite candidly that ‘the outcome of the first randomised, double blind, 
controlled study challenged the idea that dopamine replacement cells can cure 
Parkinson’s Disease’, but then asked ‘were the earlier animal studies and clinical 
reports wrong? Should we give up on the goal?’ and answered his seemingly critical 
questions with a resounding ‘no’ (Redmond, 2002: 457; see also Storch & Schwartz, 
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2002). Pierre Cesaro, a key member of NECTAR, argued even more explicitly that 
the neurosurgical approach to the treatment of PD ‘deserves new clinical trials’ 
(Cesaro, 2002: 143; emphasis added).  
 
In sum, while the NIH trial aimed to close the controversy over 
neurotransplantation, it in fact ended up re-initiating and re-articulating a debate 
that has structured the field for over two decades, between those who support the 
approach and those who object to its rationale, methodology and ethics. While the 
latter insist on the absence of any evidence for effectiveness of neurotransplantation 
and question its procedures, the former view these objections as exactly the reason to 
continue developing both the approach and the methodological robustness of its 
trials. What is especially interesting about the debate over the NIH trial, however, is 
how the two groups have harnessed the results of the trial to either promote or deter 
research on the therapeutic uses of stem cells. In this second debate, we can observe 
both how proposed therapeutic uses of stem cells articulate a particular configuration 
of the ‘self’, and how this configuration brings into view a key absence in all 
discussions about the nature and consequences of PD.  
  
Neurotransplantation, stem cells and ‘self-repair’ 
After the publication of the results of NIH trial, in early 2001, positions and 
discussions over its likely impact on the future development of stem cell technology 
rippled through various arenas. Martin Edwards, the chief executive of ReNeuron 
PLC, for example, attributed the dyskinesias observed in the trial to the uncontrolled 
growth of the implanted neuronal tissue, suggesting that, rather than relying on 
heterogeneous embryonic material, more should be done to investigate new ways of 
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producing ‘fit for purpose’ neuronal implants in the laboratory, from stem cells (see 
Boseley, 2001) . The same line of argument is evident in a running news stream in 
Nature, one of the leading scientific journals in the world, in which it was suggested 
that ‘work with neurons grown from stem cells could offer clues … [for the 
improvement of the neurosurgical treatment of PD] … because such lab-derived cells 
would contain fewer impurities than fetal tissue’ (Check, 2003; emphasis added. See 
also Meek, 2001). The uncertainty about the possible outcome of this endeavour, 
which is embedded in the last statement, contrasts sharply with the unambiguous 
assertions on the uses of stems cells to treat neurodegenerative diseases such as PD 
that are deployed in the wider, public debate over stem cell technology.  
 
Interest in the neurosurgical applications of stem cell technology has grown 
extremely rapidly since the first announcement that these cells can be multiplied and 
differentiated in vitro (see Kirschstein & Skirboll, 2001). Such interest is motivated 
by the hope that the ability to design cells for degenerating or lost tissue might bring 
about a cure for key diseases in advanced western societies, affecting the vascular 
and nervous systems of an increasingly elderly population (see Prins, 1998). 
Significantly, however, some of the most visible supporters of stem cell research have 
been the much younger actors Christopher Reeve and Michael J. Fox. While the 
former, up to his death in 2004, was paralysed from the neck down as a result of an 
accident that damaged his spinal chord, the latter has been diagnosed as suffering 
from the early effects of PD (King, 2000; Haber, 2004. See also Brown, S. E. 1996). 
Like Reeve and Fox, the latter of whom has now established his own charitable 
foundation for the promotion of research into the treatment of PD, most supporters 
of stem cell research suggest that research on the more specific biochemical 
processes by which stem cells differentiate and specialise is directly related to the 
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development of effective therapies for neurodegenerative diseases such as PD. 
Although arguing from the contrasting point of view, opponents of stem cell research 
focus overwhelmingly on the troubling, human sources from which stem cells are 
derived, paying little attention to, and thus corroborating, the claims about the 
possible effectiveness of stem cell technology. What both sides of the debate seem to 
ignore is how the prospect of soon being able to regenerate dysfunctional cellular 
tissue in situ is informed by the experience acquired in clinical transplants of 
embryonic neuronal tissue, an experience so problematic that it arguably motivates 
the search for the alternative sources to which Edwards and Nature speak in their 
reactions to the NIH trial (see De Francesco, 2001; Breeze & Wang, 1999).  
 
There is, however, another, usually unspoken, reason why stem cell technology is 
very attractive to proponents of neurotransplantation, and this involves the threat 
that neurotransplantation poses for the integrity of patients’ personal identity.  
 
Arguably, during the 1970s, neurosurgeons viewed neurotransplantation as an 
opportunity to redefine their repertoire of neurosurgical interventions at a time when 
many such interventions, for example, lobotomy, lobectomy and cingulotomy, were 
attracting considerable public and professional criticism. These psychosurgical 
interventions were increasingly viewed as unethical attempts to alter patients’ 
personal identity (see Valenstein, 1986; Pressman, 1998). Thus, when Detlef Linke, 
an iconoclastic neurologist at the University of Bonn, sought to call the emerging 
field of intracerebral neurotransplantation into question, he linked its approach to 
just these ethically disreputable interventions (Linke, 1992). Some within the 
community of bioethicists, and Georg Northoff, a philosopher and clinical 
psychiatrist at the University of Magdeburg, in particular, have responded to such 
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criticism by denying that neurotransplantation poses any threat to the integrity of 
patients’ personal identity (Northoff, 1996. See also Boer, 1999; McCrae, 2003). 
Insisting on the empirical grounding of ethical discourse, their denial of the threat 
rests on appeals to contemporary neurobiological knowledge to question any link 
between the implantation of biological material in one region of the brain and effects 
on another location, specifically the complex neural network that is said to sustain 
‘self’ and ‘identity’ in human subjects. On the other hand, this bootstrapping 
manoeuvre ignores how psychosurgery and neurotransplantation share the 
controversial assumption that particular aspects of ‘personality’ can be located in 
specific regions of the brain (see Smith, 1992; Star, 1989; 1992). Furthermore, if the 
distinctions operated by such mapping of the brain have sometimes proved 
controversial, attempting to maintain a categorical distinction between the 
‘restoration’ and the ‘alteration’ of personality provides an alternative strategy for 
differentiation between ethically acceptable and unacceptable neurosurgical 
interventions (see Northoff, 1996). These rhetorical strategies are particularly 
evident in Robert Breeze and Marjorie Wang’s technical review of developments in 
the field of neurotransplantation. While they acknowledge common historical origins 
and epistemic assumptions, they seek to distance neurotransplantation from the like 
of lobotomy, lobectomy and cingulotomy by associating the latter with ‘so-called 
functional neurosurgery (emphasis added)’, despite many of our actors’ explicit 
disciplinary identification with the very same field of ‘functional neurosurgery’. 
Furthermore, they emphasise the difference between ‘destruction’ and ‘restoration’ 
of neural tissue, despite the dependence of ‘restoration’ on the introduction of 
exogenous neural tissue such that ‘alteration’ and ‘restoration’ are in fact 
conceptually indistinguisheable (Breeze & Wang, 1999). Stem cell technology would 
seem, however, to provide a technical solution to these ethical problems. In fact, the 
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prospect of initiating the ‘self-repair’ of the brain with undifferentiated and 
pluripotent cellular tissue would seem to offer a definitive closure of the ethical 
problem. As a review of investments by the biotechnology industry in the field of 
neurotransplantation put it, there will have been no therapeutic intervention because 
‘neural stem cells [will] act as nature’s own brain surgeon, psychiatrist, pharmacist, 
and therapist’ (Spalding, 2000; see also Boer, 1999; Grisolía, 2002).  
 
Importantly, the promotion of ‘self-repair’, motivated by these disparate social and 
historical considerations, reinforces a vision of the ‘self’ for which there are 
identifiable neural boundaries and pathways. We suggest that such reinforcement of 
the ‘self’ as the unrelated, yet pivotal, issue for stem cell research points towards an 
operative absence or blank presence in the debate over neurotransplantation for PD. 
We therefore return to the debate over the NIH trial. 
 
The ‘regime of hope’ and the ‘regime of truth’  
From the description given in the sections above, it is possible to see the debate over 
the NIH trial as evolving around two alternative positions. On the one hand, there 
are those actors who view the trial as demonstrating the worthlessness of the 
neurosurgical approach and those who cannot see any justification to continue 
submitting patients to expensive, hazardous treatments and ethically questionable 
research practices. On the other hand, there are those actors who view the trial as an 
example of how not to conduct research, but then point to the success of the 
neurosurgical approach in animals as reason for continued investment. We suggest 
that these two positions can be understood as deploying more general forms of 
argument, which, rhetorically, revolve around the tropes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’. 
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Significantly, the actors in the debate over the NIH trial, and even within the more 
broadly defined field of neurotransplantation, deploy these two tropes both 
repeatedly and in a patterned manner that articulates distinct subject positions. 
Moreover, the deployment of the two tropes can be analysed further, in terms of 
distinct orderings and aggregations of actors. These orderings and aggregations 
constitute the formations in, and through, which these same actors construct and 
adjust their positions in debates around the purpose and value of biomedicine. In 
doing so, these formations generate and perform distributions, defining or 
embodying a characteristic approach to what might, does, or should, pass from 
whom to what, under what circumstances (Law, 1994). In other words, they generate 
and perform distinctive distributions of value, power and agency around the ‘patient’ 
or ‘sufferer’ of the condition under debate (see Rose & Novas, 2000; Brown, N. 2003; 
Brown, N. & Michael, 2003).   
 
The ‘regime of hope’ is characterised by the view that new and better treatments are 
always about to come, being tested, ‘in the pipeline’. More specifically, research and 
development is justified by the promise of finding miraculous cures for debilitating 
diseases. Such promise entails endless deferrals to stabilise the identity of the 
therapy, its constituents and effects, a deferral that can be justified in various 
manners. In the case on hand, these tactical deferrals range from NECTAR’s 
methodological critique of the NIH trial to arguments over the appropriate nature 
and quantity of embryonic neural material that should be used for more effective 
transplants. In fact, if the responses to the NIH trial are at all imprinted by the public 
debates over the sources of the materials used in technologies such as the 
transplantation of embryonic neuronal material, their traces are to be found in the 
arguments over the large quantity of foetal material required for successful 
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implantation and the feasibility of xenotransplantation, the transplantation of 
biological material across species, as an alternative, more copious and less 
problematic source of implants (Fink, 2000; Hagel & Brundin, 2001; see also 
Clemmit, 1992). The following opposition of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ perhaps best captures 
the spirit of such deferrals: ‘We do not know the truth: there is hope’.  
 
The ‘regime of truth’, on the other hand, entails an investment in what is positively 
known, rather than what can be. That is to say, it is characterised by the view that 
most medical therapies are less effective than claimed, and this involves the constant 
returning of new and promising approaches to their original claims, their clinical 
failures and to their ethical downfalls. Thus, for some actors, the NIH trial 
demonstrated what they already knew, namely that neurotransplantation was an 
ineffective therapy. For others, the NIH trial was populated by a series of biological 
and methodological problems that were not compatible with the practices of 
veridicity in contemporary health care (Moreira, 2004). The Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
Technology Evaluation Center’s conclusion about the relative merits of the surgical 
and pharmacological approaches exemplifies this view, which can be then opposed to 
the ‘regime of hope’ by a quite different opposition of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’. These actors 
seem to be saying: ‘We know the truth: there is no hope’. It is important to recall, at 
this point, that, although the pharmacological approach to the treatment of PD might 
be said to be a ‘tried and tested’ one, it explicitly entails recognition that death is 
inevitable. 
 
Around these two recurrent positionings we find different aggregations of actors. The 
‘regime of hope’ draws together new biotechnology companies such as ReNeuron 
PLC, and the investors in these companies, all of whom depend upon the promise of 
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the neurosurgical approach for a return on their investment of financial capital; there 
also are neurobiologists, who construct models of degenerative diseases, and the 
neurologists and neurosurgeons, all of whom have dedicated large part of their 
careers and intellectual capital to the development of neurotransplantation. Finally, 
there are charities such as the Parkinson’s Disease Society, whose aim is to maintain 
all possibilities of treatment open. The ‘regime of truth’ aggregates a very different 
set of groups of actors. Here we find the ‘therapeutic reformers’ in the NIH who set 
up and assessed the methodological quality of the trial (see Marks, 1997). There also 
are health care buyers and insurers, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, who are not 
convinced that the considerable costs of the neurosurgical approach are justified, all 
too aware of a fundamental difference between ‘tried and tested’ measures and 
developments in ‘investigational settings’ (see Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 2004). 
Importantly, there also are those pharmaceutical companies worried about the 
competition from new molecular approaches to the treatment of PD (see Bracco, 
2002). 
 
Finally, the ‘regime of hope’ and the ‘regime of truth’ differ in the way they imagine 
and configure the patient. In the ‘regime of hope’, actors tend to figure the patient as 
someone who is invested in becoming less entrapped by their physical condition; this 
patient may sometimes be desperate, but they are always waiting for new solutions to 
their entrapment. In the ‘regime of truth’, by contrast, patients are figured as 
consumers of health care, concerned to compare the relative merits of 
pharmacological and surgical approaches, by taking into consideration their 
effectiveness, risk of harm, and cost. In their opposing configurations of the patient, 
the two regimes both attempt to distribute knowledge and agency between expert 
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and the lay public, and thus to engage, some might say to ‘interpellate’, the patient’s 
‘self’ from different perspectives (Althusser, 1994).  
 
Strikingly, the different subjectivities enacted by the ‘regime of truth’ and the ‘regime 
of hope’ resonate with contemporary debates about embodiment and political 
subjectivity, which we suggest are important to explore, if we are to more fully 
understand the predicament confronting the Lambert family.   
 
The ‘politics of life’ versus the ‘politics of death’ 
When researching the debate over the NIH trial, we progressively realized, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, that social scientists are not removed observers of the regimes of 
‘truth’ and ‘hope’, but active participants in their constitution (Dehue, 2002). Those 
social scientists who view the neurosurgical approach as another example of 
unjustified hype surrounding contemporary biomedicine, and maintain that 
medicine has not in fact changed the way we live since the introduction of basic 
public health measures in the nineteenth century, can readily be associated with the 
‘regime of truth’. For them, the truth is that we have always begun to die the day we 
were born, and nothing has changed, biological life continuing to be norm against 
which politics must be judged. On the other side, we find social scientists either 
celebrating or worrying about how science is enabling humans to go beyond their 
supposedly fixed, biological abilities. Their argument is that we are creating the 
norms of our own life (see Mykhalovskyi & Weir, 2004; Caplan, 2003). What is at 
stake in this opposition is intimately linked with the important contrast between the 
perspectives on embodiment and political subjectivity articulated by Michel Foucault 
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and Giorgio Agamben, on the one hand, and Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, on the 
other.  
 
This link is observable when we interrogate the modes of reproduction of both 
regimes. The ultimate aim of the ‘regime of truth’ is closure, each argumentative 
move returning to its point of origin, to the original question, to the truth of the 
matter. As such, it rests on the representation of the state of affairs as it is now, 
enacting a regime in which the collective is organised around the norm of life, as it is 
and always has been. Agamben usefully articulates the full implications of such 
organisation by questioning the extent to which Foucault’s labelling of the modern 
link between embodiment and political subjectivity as ‘biopolitical’ is in fact a 
misnomer. For Agamben, ‘biopolitics’, the productive deployment of the known 
generative powers of life to regulate and manage political existence, rests on the 
production of a form of being that is endowed with no potential and that is in 
suspension between life and death, ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998; see also Foucault, 
1990: 150-159). The most vivid and relevant exemplification of this pivotal concept 
are the ‘brain dead’, who are biologically ‘alive’, but socially and juridico-politically 
‘dead’ (Agamben, 1998: 160-165; see also Lock, 2002). As such, the ‘biopolitical’ is 
better understood as a ‘politics of death’, a ‘thanatopolitics’. The main resource for 
the ‘regime of hope’ is instead capital, whose reproduction demands a belief in a 
future rather than a resignation to, or an investment in, the present. The future, 
rather than the past, is this regime’s distinctive temporal orientation. Continuous 
opening of action, with no point of return, is its strategic aim. The ‘regime of hope’ 
thus enacts what Rabinow and Rose have called the ‘politics of life’, a mode of 
existence characterised by the endless possibilities of humanity as it finally comes to 
terms with its embodiment. Again, the most vivid and relevant exemplification of this 
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understanding is the emerging figure of the ‘neurochemical self’, deeply enmeshed in 
a world where the staid, historical boundaries between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ are 
everywhere shattered (Rose, 2003. See also Rabinow, 1996; Rabinow & Rose, 2003). 
 
These two contrasting views on embodiment and subjectivity powerfully resonate 
with differing views of the relationship between the neurosurgical approach to PD 
and stem cell technology, particular in relation to the question of ‘self-repair’. If the 
‘politics of death’ seems more aligned with a critique of the suspension of human life 
entailed by stem cell ‘culture’, much, as Agamben would put it, in the same way that 
concentrations camps operated, constructing the ‘self-repairing’ body might be 
understood as marking the achievement of the alignment that Rabinow and Rose 
imagine, and it must necessarily be ‘imagined’, given the temporal structure of the 
‘regime of hope’. In sum, in the debate about the character of contemporary political 
subjectivity, the opposition of ‘thanatopolitics’ and ‘biopolitics’ beautifully 
encapsulates the struggle that contemporary biomedicine rehearses over human 
subjectivity. 
 
Questioning ‘self-repair’: A technical interlude 
Because we have argued that ‘self repair’ sustains the boundary between the ‘politics 
of life’ and the ‘politics of death’, we would now like to a draw attention to two 
problems concerning the goal of ‘self repair’, which, if we are to credit the network of 
citations linked to the final report on the NIH trial that we generated through 
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The first problem is how to best understand the loss of control over motor function. 
One position draws on a dopaminergic understanding, whereby PD is defined as a 
malfunction of the physiological systems controlling the production and distribution 
of dopamine. The effectiveness of the neurosurgical approach is then determined, 
firstly, by the relative success in implanting the embryonic material, secondly, by the 
increased uptake of dopamine, as measured by positron emission tomography (PET), 
and, thirdly, by the correlation between the first two and post-operative motor 
control. The latter is usually assessed by standardised tests such as the Unified 
Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale, which measures ‘finger dexterity, supination-
pronation, foot tapping, and ‘stand-walk-sit” (Kopyov, 1996: 327; see also Price, 
1995; Sass, 1995). 
   
Figure 3: PET scans before (L) and after (R) implantation (see Dumit, 2003). 
 
While the first two criteria were initially distinguished from the third one in terms of 
‘therapeutic’ versus ‘clinical’ effects, presumably due to doubts about the causal 
relationship between the degeneration of the striatum region of the brain and motor 
control, the distinction was gradually relaxed in the wake of increasing evidence that 
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successful grafting led to some improvement in motor control. The relaxation was 
never total, however, perhaps betraying continuing uncertainty about the 
dopaminergic definition of PD (see Lindvall, 1989; Peschanski, 1994; Kordower, 
1995). In fact, even before the NIH trial was closed, Ivar Mendez, Director of the 
Neural Transplantation Laboratory at Dalhousie University, and his two students, 
Arun Ramachandran and Lynsey Bartlett, observed that while ‘many transplant 
recipients obtain clinically useful symptom relief … in all cases functional recovery is 
incomplete’ (Ramachandran, Bartlett & Mendez, 2000: 243; emphasis added).  
This further taxonomic complication might suggest that Mendez’ position is closer to 
the definition of PD offered in the report by the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Technology 
Evaluation Center, which includes a range of psychological symptoms whose causal 
relationship to motor control is left open, perhaps ‘because the degenerative nature 
of Parkinson’s Disease is not restricted solely to the dopaminergic systems’ (Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield Technology Evaluation Center, 2001: 1).  
 
Strikingly, however, Mendez has recently suggested that a better way forward for the 
neurosurgical treatment of PD may be to insert dopaminergic implants not just in the 
striatum, but also in the nigral region of the brain (Mendez, 2002; see also Hagell, 
2002). Mendez thus reasserts the importance of the dopaminergic definition of PD, 
but also begs questions about the cerebral localisation of PD. It is important to note, 
moreover, that this answer is not motivated by criticism such as that voiced by the 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield Technology Evaluation Center, but is instead generated by an 
altogether different ‘truth-making engine’ best exemplified by NECTAR. This said, 
the second problem is that, even disregarding the difficulties confronting the 
dopaminergic definition, so vocally championed by NECTAR, experimental controls 
are not easily established. As Paul Morrish, Guy Sawle and David Brooks, from the 
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Medical Research Council Cyclotron Unit at Hammersmith Hospital, noted while the 
NIH trial was in progress, ‘Parkinson’s Disease has a widely variable rate of 
progression’, so that linking its stage of development to changes in dopamine levels is 
an ‘insufficiently sensitive’ diagnostic tool (Morrish, Sawle & Brooks, 1995: 597; see 
also Sawle, 1992; Remy, 1995; Rinne, 1999). Consequently, it has proved difficult to 
quantify the specific dopaminergic effects of the implants in the context of the 
overall, continuing degeneration of the striatum (Piccini, 1999). More importantly, 
however, the distinction between the dopaminergic effects of the implanted material 
and the degenerating striatum would seem to betray the notion that the successful 
implantation of embryonic neuronal material is a step toward the goal of ‘self-repair’. 
If this is simply a matter of temporal sequence, whose horizon is the disappearance 
of any difference between exogenous implants and endogenous tissue, it is worth 
noting that Warren Olanow, at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine and a leading 
figure in the field of neurotransplantation, has disputed that the dyskinesias, the 
uncontrolled movements, observed in the treatment group in the NIH trial were due 
to an unexpected overactivity of the implanted tissue, and has argued that they may 
instead have been due to an immune response, which could not be excluded because 
those involved in the trial did not use any immunosuppressants (Olanow, 2003).  
 
In the light of these above two problems, neurotransplantation remains closer to the 
engineering of a heterologous remedy, not fundamentally different to the 
pharmacological treatment for PD, championed by the Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
Technology Evaluation Center, than to achieving the autologous ‘self-repair’ of the 
brain promoted by the biotechnology industry, which foresees ‘neural stem cells 
[becoming] nature’s own brain surgeon, psychiatrist, pharmacist, and therapist’. 
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Questioning ‘self-repair’: A theoretical excursus 
If, up to this point, the regimes of ‘hope’ and ‘truth’ seemed to be two diametrically 
opposed versions of the values of biomedicine, through the notion of ‘self-repair’ and 
the debates over its technical problems it is possible to see how these two regimes are 
in fact predicated on each other. Again, it is through the resonance between the 
debates about PD and those about the relationship between embodiment and 
political subjectivity, that it is possible to understand how the interlocking of the two 
regimes is mediated through the manner in which they imagine and configure the 
‘self’.  
 
In the context of advancing a ‘politics of life’, Paul Rabinow has opposed Michel 
Foucault’s ‘will to knowledge’ with a ‘will to experiment’, which he characterises as 
‘an experimental mode of inquiry … where one confronts a problem whose answer is 
not known in advance rather than already having answers and then seeking a 
problem’ (Rabinow, 1999: 174. See also Rabinow, 2003; Foucault, 2000). In so 
doing, however, Rabinow overlooks how any experiment always is simultaneously 
located within two distinct temporal frames. On the one hand, it is orientated toward 
a future event, such as the stabilisation of the neurosurgical approach to the 
treatment of PD and the realisation of all that it promises for the future of humanity. 
Such orientation towards the future can be said to be the distinctive temporality of 
the ‘regime of hope’. Its strategy is maximising. Such maximising, and therefore 
potentiating, orientation, whether practical, as is the case with the exponents of 
neurotransplantation, or philosophical, as is the case for the ‘will to experiment’, 
must be necessarily shaped by a deployment of the past and its problems, however. 
When expectations of the experiment are not met, as was the case in the NIH trial, 
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this is not the end, but it none the less requires reflection and investment in what is 
known to proceed beyond the present (see Cussins, 1998). In other words, to begin to 
articulate an alternative approach, it is necessary to retrace the path and reassess 
what is known. In the case of the ‘will to experiment’, it entails a reflection on the 
history of thought about the relationship between embodiment and political 
subjectivity, from the mediaeval invention of the ‘purgatory’ to the modern concept 
of ‘human dignity’ (Rabinow, 1999). As such, the process of articulating the future 
involves engagement with the ‘regime of truth’, whose practices of veridicity are 
grounded in the past and are strategically minimizing. From this perspective, the 
NIH trial represents a return to the point of departure, from which it is possible to 
elaborate new questions. In this same process, however, the ‘regime of truth’ 
confronts the minimal answer with an expanding horizon of possible questions, 
whose proliferation is none the less necessary to guarantee the continuity of the 
‘regime of truth’.  
 
If the regimes of ‘hope’ and ‘truth’ can then be said to include each other in the very 
same moment that actors articulate their differences, the relationship between two 
regimes is best conceived as one of ‘mutual parasitism’. As one of us has argued 
elsewhere: 
 
Mutual parasitism corresponds to a looping process through which different knowledge 
practices – or regimes - progressively generate their own epistemic resources by 
translating each others’. In appropriating each other’s resources, these knowledges create 
a composite. This composite, however, is never truly harmonised as it depends upon the 
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In other words, the regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ assume, if they do not in fact 
require, a single, determinate and common point of reference to which it is possible 
to return or from which it is possible to depart and differ from. Not only do the 
opposing regimes depend upon this agreed entity, but it also is the common 
condition of possibility for their continuous disagreement. We suggest that such 
point of reference is the ‘self’.  
 
While any reference to the ‘self’ is notably absent from the debates over both the 
goals and effectiveness of the neurosurgical approach, the opposing positions can be 
understood as either assuming a fixed ‘self’ that can possibly recover pre-existing 
potentialities, or as aspiring to re-launch a neurophysiological dynamic from which a 
new ‘self’ can emerge. A similar interlocking opposition is evident in the way in which 
the regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ imagine the PD patient. While one imagines a 
patient who is sometimes desperate, but always waiting and ready to test new and 
promising, but untested, solutions to their situation, the other imagines a patient 
who is concerned to compare the positively known merits of alternative approaches 
to forestalling their demise. Strikingly, this same commonly centred opposition is 
still more sharply evident in Agamben, Rose and Rabinow’s reflections on 
embodiment and political subjectivity. For the latter two, the contemporary, 
embodied ‘self’ is to be understood as so constantly under erasure as to become 
increasingly synonymous with ‘life itself’ (Rose, 2001). For Agamben, this equation, 
which he labels ‘bare life’, undoubtedly is deeply troubling, but, paradoxically, it also 
is, to use Michel Foucault’s famous phrase, the key to ‘to counter[ing] the grips of 
power’ (Foucault, 1990: 157. See also Agamben, 1999a).  
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In sum, the composite of the regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’ constitutes and maintains 
the existence of the ‘self’, both as the ultimate truth and the greatest hope. In this 
process, the ‘self’ becomes unavoidable, confirmed at every turn of the debate, 
progressively established as the only path for public engagement and the main 
obligation of the subject. In sum, the ‘self’ becomes the one and only vehicle of 
subjectification. 
 
Who is Alfred? 
We opened the paper by asking: Why is Alfred not interested in getting better? Why 
will he not at least admit to the hopelessness of his situation? We seem, however, to 
have failed to answer these questions. In fact, if anything, our argument leads to the 
view Alfred’s disengagement is unintelligible. How are we to understand Alfred’s 
disengagement from both the ‘regime of truth’, which would require him to both 
recognise the hopelessness of his situation and to make suitable arrangements in this 
light, and the ‘regime of hope’ advanced by the Axon Corporation? How are we to 
understand his non-engagement with the two versions of ‘self’ proposed by the 
regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’, equally represented by the other four members of the 
Lambert family? How are we to account for his refusal, his very absence? In other 
words, how are we to understand obscurity, dependent as we are upon the 
justificatory frames that actors offer to us to understand their worlds? Michel Callon 
and Vololona Rabeharisoa have recently formulated this very same question, with 
regard to Gino, a silent sufferer of muscular dystrophy (Callon & Rabeharisoa, 2004). 
Confronting such silence, they set out to argue that Gino, as a person, expresses a 
confrontation two sets of demands. On the one hand, there are the demands of the 
public sphere, for the visibility, articulation and debatability of his reasons for 
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refusing any engagement with the world of biomedicine. On the other hand, there are 
the demands for opacity, non-argumentation and exclusion that would seem to be 
Gino’s way of life. Yet, in attempting to describe and understand Gino’s silence, 
Callon and Rabeharisoa cannot but endow him with a subjectivity, that is, an ability 
to position himself outside the arena of biomedical discourse and techniques. Gino’s 
efforts to make his actions, and, more importantly, himself, opaque to others are, at 
least partly, an effect of Callon and Rabeharisoa’s very presence and interpellation. 
Moreover, by attempting to make Gino’s desire for opacity visible, Callon and 
Rabeharisoa are also working against the non-accountability Gino would appear to 
desire most. This was perhaps inevitable. As Callon and Rabeharisoa note, the social 
and human sciences cannot but fail to multiply local ways of being, locked as they are 
in addressing public issues. At the same time, however, Callon and Rabearisoa also 
direct our attention to the way in which, as we move towards obscurity and 
indeterminate ways of being, the ability to position and recognise oneself in action is 
progressively lost. Such loss is beautifully expressed in Jonathan Frazen’s 
description, in the extract given in the beginning of the paper, of Alfred’s momentary 
experience of disconnection:  
 
In the instant of realizing he was lost, time became marvellously slow and he discovered 
hitherto unguessed eternities in the space between one word and the next, or rather he 
became trapped in that space between words and could only stand and watch as time 
sped on without him (emphasis added). 
 
Through the literary artefact that is The Corrections, and it cannot be otherwise, 
Franzen attempts to give voice to an experience of transcendence that is beyond 
words, space and time. In this way, we are able to glimpse both the experience of dis-
location and self-lessness, and its obscurity. Yet, in the very moment in which such 
glimpse is achieved, it loses its significance because what we glimpse is the emptiness 
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of our own sight. What is left, is a feeling for the precariousness of our own selves, 
how we, like Albert, can ‘slip through’ the tightly fit links between our environments 
and ourselves and not find ourselves anymore. In returning to clarity and 
accountability, we realise that this slippage is beyond our control, beyond ourselves 
and beyond words. It happens to us so that we are not always, already … 
 
 POSTSCRIPT: A DIALOGUE 
Paolo: Perhaps, however, more could be said about the tension between making the 
experience visible and the obscurities it produces in the very process of 
representation, because this obscurity is precisely that ‘bare life’ with which Giorgio 
Agamben is so concerned (Agamben, 1998; 1999b).  
 
Tiago: But aren’t you still attempting to represent obscurity by giving it a name, and 
describing it as a suspension that produces the very process of representation? I am 
not sure that is the solution to this predicament. Perhaps what Michel Callon and 
Vololona Rabeharisoa address is part of a much more general ambition of western 
philosophy to ‘represent’ and fix on ‘what is’, on ontology (Jullien, 2002). Perhaps 
our ability to represent is predicated upon our realisation that there is an 
unrepresentable, but attempting to then represent this unrepresentable seems to 
undermine the key tension between clarity/self and obscurity/other.  
 
Paolo: I agree with you totally … but … why are Callon and Rabeharisoa so taken 
with, and endebted to, Gino, if not as a figure of the limit? I cannot help but recall the 
following, perceptive historical observation, from Michel Foucault’s Order of Things: 
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Man and the unthought are … contemporaries. Man has not been able to describe himself 
as a configuration in an episteme without thought at the same time discovering, both in 
itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in its very warp and woof, an element of 
darkness, an apparently inert density in which it is embedded … (Foucault, 1970: 326; see 
also Deleuze, 1988). 
 
I would then want to ‘gesture’ toward Agamben’s and Slavoj Žižek’s diagnoses of this 
situation (Agamben, 2000; see also Žižek, 1999). In other words, I would want to 
emphasise the historical specificity of the situation in which the ‘he’ in ‘in the instant 
of realizing he was lost, time became marvellously slow and he discovered hitherto 
unguessed eternities in the space between one word and the next, or rather he 
became trapped in that space between words and could only stand and watch as time 
sped on without him’ must be said to lose any valence in itself and by itself. The point 
of this ‘gesture’ is that our, dare I say poetic, evocation of something about the 
human that is ‘not always, already’ should be understood as willing the return of 
critical practice to something that is not simply the inert medium of discursive 
machinery, be it ‘bare life’ or a ‘platform’ (see Keating & Cambrosio, 2003), but as 
something that causes both the machinery and associated critical apparatus to stutter 
and splutter. Toward the end of his own life, Gilles Deleuze spoke of it as ‘a life …’ 




Tiago and Paolo: <Wry laughter> 
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